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Introduction  
In the on-going debates about additional financial powers for 
the Scottish Parliament, fiscal autonomy and indeed the 
independence referendum and the ‘devolution max’ 
alternative, giving Scotland powers over all or some aspects 
of social security is, for many, a Rubicon-crossing decision; 
a point of no return. However UK Government’s welfare 
benefit reforms in general and the cuts to Housing Benefit in 
particular have given this issue urgency. The Holyrood 
Committee examining the Scotland Bill and debates in the 
chamber have questioned the absence of Scottish powers in 
areas, such as housing, where a reserved policy (such as 
Housing Benefit) limits the ability of the Scottish Parliament 
to determine the outcome of devolved policy areas (such as 
housing). In the election campaign, the SNP manifesto said 
that the party would seek the devolution of Housing Benefit. 
 
In this exploratory paper, we look at the prospects for 
devolving Housing Benefit within the existing settlement (i.e. 
with the rest of social security reserved) and also in terms of 
a devolution max variant wherein the rest of the social 
security system is also devolved. However, in order to fully 
grasp the possibilities and challenges facing such policy 
reform, it is important to first set out how the Housing 
Benefit system works and interacts with both income 
maintenance and housing policies. This reveals important 
structural problems with the present system, ones that will 
remain unresolved by the reforms and cuts presently 
underway. 
 
The context for devolving benefit 
 
The current system 
Housing Benefit is nested within and essential to the present 
working of means-tested benefits within the reserved UK 
system of social security. Eligibility is limited to tenants, but 
extends to both those who are in or out of work (subject to a 
means-test). 
 
It fulfils two essential functions: 
 
 income maintenance: Housing Benefit is designed 
to protect incomes after rents to ensure that 
households can purchase sufficient other 
necessities; 
 
 affordability: Housing Benefit limits the burden of 
housing costs to some households so that they do 
not absorb a disproportionate amount of the 
household budget. 
 
It is this ambiguity between the housing policy objectives 
and those of income maintenance that sets the UK system 
apart from its continental counterparts and is at the heart of 
many of its difficulties. The income maintenance objective 
became more explicit in the system introduced in 1988. It 
explains why (in principle) Housing Benefit can pay the 
whole of someone’s rent and why (in principle) a rent 
increase in its entirety can be met by it. 
 
Such policy dualism also helps to explain why it has been 
difficult to reform (Stephens, 2005). The UK housing lobby 
has often been drawn to other European housing allowance 
models where, to simplify, less generous targeted 
allowances have operated alongside more generous 
systems of social security and pensions (see: Kemp, editor, 
2007). The UK is unique in making no allowance for housing 
costs within its mainstream social security benefits.  
 
Looking at the system’s details, eligible council tenants 
receive rent rebates, which are operated as deductions from 
their rents. They are directly applied to the individual rent 
statements of tenants by the council, which also administers 
the system. An assumption is made in the financial 
settlement for the Scottish Parliament each year relating to 
average rent increases and their consequent impact on the 
Rent Rebate bill, which is an explicit part of the Parliament’s 
public spending block. Eligible housing association tenants 
receive a rent allowance, which, for virtually all intents, is the 
same system from the point of view of tenants, though it is 
not controlled fiscally in the same way and has no direct 
implications for the Scottish Block.  Private tenants are, 
however, treated differently through the Local Housing 
Allowance system (see below).  
 
The general position for a social (council or housing 
association) tenant in terms of eligibility is that, provided 
their rent is less than or equal to their eligible housing cost 
ceiling, they will have all of their rent met by Housing Benefit 
if their assessed weekly income is less than or equal to the 
their assessed need for their household circumstances (the 
applicable amount of the income support scheme, modified 
for Housing Benefit purposes – e.g. employing assumptions 
about the levels of savings allowed). Should their income 
rise above the assessed need threshold, there is a 65 pence 
reduction in Housing Benefit for every pound that income 
exceeds the applicable amount (until it falls to zero).  
 
Housing Benefit thus prevents eligible rents from taking 
incomes below social assistance (e.g. JSA, IS, Pension 
Credit) levels and this implies that rising rents will be fully 
met provided they remain within eligible housing cost limits.  
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At the same time, rising rents will draw more households 
into eligibility. This is reinforced by the practice of the great 
majority of housing association landlords receiving Housing 
Benefit directly from the administrating local authority rather 
than via the tenant. This practice of ‘Rent Direct’ ensures 
rent/benefit payments reach the landlord and helps to 
reduce the incidence of arrears but it also further 
disconnects the tenant from the responsibility for meeting 
their housing costs. 
 
There are further complexities. Eligible recipients receive 
‘earnings disregards’ that do not count as assessed income 
in order to encourage work. Second, adult children or other 
non-dependents living in a larger household are assumed to 
make a contribution to the rent. Thus eligible rent is reduced 
through ‘non-dependent deductions’, so reducing Housing 
Benefit.  Third, the system discourages young people (aged 
under 26) from living independently by setting a Housing 
Benefit ceiling (the ‘single room rent’) as if they lived in 
bedsit accommodation with shared facilities. 
 
Eligible private tenants receive the Local Housing 
Allowance. LHA sets standard eligible rents at the median 
market rent for broad market rental areas for different sizes 
of properties. In principle, where an eligible private tenant 
received that allowance, and if rents are less than the 
allowance, the claimant could keep part of the difference (up 
to £15) – thereby rewarding shopping around for value. But 
if the actual rent comes out above the median, the tenant 
would have to pay the difference. If a tenant’s 
circumstances and hence income changes, this will be 
reflected in eligible Housing Benefit in the same way as with 
social tenants. The other key feature of the Local Housing 
Allowance is that apart from those tenants deemed to be 
vulnerable and those already in arrears, the benefit takes 
the form of a cheque or bank transfer to tenants – there are 
no direct payments to landlords.  
 
The scale of housing benefit 
Measured in cash terms, GB Housing Benefit was £11.65 
billion in 2000-2001 and rose to £17.50 billion in 2008-09. 
The estimated outturn figure for 2009-10 was £20.44 billion 
and the planned figure for 2010-11 was in excess of £22 
billion (Pawson and Wilcox, 2010, Table 114).  This 
increase in cost and the threat of further increases explains 
the priority that government benefit cuts focused on Housing 
Benefit immediately after the formation of the Coalition. 
 
The caseload evidence suggests a significant fall in rent 
rebate cases (from 2.1 million in 2001 to 1.5 million in 2010 
for GB) compared with a near doubling in rent allowances 
(from 1.7 million to 3.2 million across the same period - 
Pawson and Wilcox, 2010, Table 115a). Further 
disaggregation of the rent allowance data between housing 
associations and private rented housing confirms large 
caseload growth for both (not quite doubling between 2001 
and 2010) with the association caseload still slightly larger. 
The reduction in the number of rent rebate recipients and 
increase in housing association recipients reflects the 
transfer of council stock to associations. 
 
This shift also occurred in Scotland, where the rent rebate 
caseload fell from 214,000 in 2001 to 151,000 in 2010, 
whereas rent allowances increased from 92,000 to 186,000 
in the same period (Pawson and Wilcox, 2010, Tables 115b 
and 115c). The Scottish Government (2011) also report 
(pp.10-11) that the largest single group receiving HB are the 
over 65s (which is otherwise flatly distributed by age). 
Nearly 2 in 3 recipients are single people without 
dependents but almost one in five are single parent 
households. Only 6% are couples with dependent children. 
Although it is difficult to be precise, it appears that current 
annual expenditure on Housing Benefit in Scotland is of the 
order of £1.6-1.8 billion (author calculations). 
 
Benefit cuts and the universal credit 
The debate about devolving Housing Benefit’s future is not 
primarily constitutional but rather the result of the dramatic 
changes to benefits underway as a result of the policies of 
the UK Government (though politically this has clear 
constitutional bearing). The Housing Benefit cuts fall into 
two categories: those that will affect the private rented 
sector through changes to the Local Housing Allowance 
(LHA) and those that will impact on housing benefit more 
generally.  
 
The changes specific to the private rented sector (the LHA) 
concern: 
 
 Originally planned by the Labour Government, the 
removal of the £15 excess i.e. tenants will no 
longer be able to keep the difference or savings 
made (up to £15) between actual rent paid and the 
LHA (introduced in April 2011). 
 
 The LHA calculation for eligible rent was changed 
from deriving the LHA with the 30th rather than the 
median (50th percentile) of the local rent 
distribution (introduced in April 2011) – the actual 
reduction will depend on the distribution of local 
rents. 
 
 From April 2013, the basis of annual up-rating will 
change from a proportion of actual market rents to 
the CPI. Over the past decade private rents have 
increased faster than general price inflation.  
 
 A cap or maximum was placed on LHA by room 
size – from April 2011 LHA rates were capped 
including removing the largest 5 bedroom rate and 
implying a £400 per week overall cap (i.e. the 4 
bed ceiling). 
 
 From April 2012, the coverage of the single room 
rent for single person household claimants living in 
private rented housing from under 26 will be 
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expanded to those up to 35 living alone for new 
tenants and existing tenants after review. 
 
The other main HB changes that will apply across the rented 
housing system are: 
 
 Changing the rules for non-dependent deductions, 
so that previous rent increases are now taken into 
account effectively increasing non-dependent 
deductions and thus reducing HB for such 
households from April 2011. The Scottish Local 
Government Forum against Poverty (2011) 
estimates that the cost of fully uprating these 
deductions back to 2001 will entail an average 27% 
increase in non-dependent deductions, phased in 
over three years (p.19). 
 
 From April 2013, HB for working age tenants 
deemed to be under-occupying based on a 
standard regional rate for appropriate property 
sizes. 
 
 There will be a ceiling on all HB from April 2013 
between £350-500 depending on household type. 
 
Whilst these changes are introduced, it is the Government’s 
intention that Housing Benefit should disappear among the 
working age population as it is subsumed within the 
Universal Credit. This simplification of means-tested 
assistance for the working age population is intended to 
confer responsibility on the beneficiary partly through the 
use of increased conditionality.  The Universal Credit will 
operate on a single taper of 65% of net earnings, along with 
the retention of earnings disregards. Although the 
Parliamentary Bill to introduce the Universal Credit is now 
nearing completion, it is still not clear how housing costs will 
be dealt with within it.  
 
The Government also intends to end the direct payment of 
housing-related assistance to (social) landlords. Certainly, 
the aim of the UC is to provide the tenant with a single 
integrated payment and the question remains how this might 
be moderated to help landlords with vulnerable households 
and those already in arrears (as happens with the LHA). 
Second, in the long term the DWP anticipates a move from 
housing support based on actual costs (as with the current 
way Housing Benefit works) and a move to some form of 
fixed rate charge (although this might be locally-based, as 
with the Local Housing Allowance). Certainly, it is hard to 
see how the Universal Credit can achieve its fundamental 
goals if Housing Benefit remains separate and detached. 
 
Devolving Housing Benefit 1 (Social Security 
Reserved) 
Alongside the critical political reaction in Scotland to the cuts 
in Housing Benefit
2
, the advent of Universal Credit might 
well seem like a suitable point at which to devolve Housing 
Benefit, and to make a ‘clean break.’ The principal attraction 
to this approach is that Scotland would be able to design its 
own housing allowance, and at the least restructure it to be 
more consistent with or supportive of other housing policies 
(and welfare policies).  
A key risk concerns future budgets for Housing Benefit and, 
related, the initial settlement of how much Housing Benefit 
the Scottish Parliament would receive on its devolution. The 
reform would necessitate a negotiation between Holyrood 
and Westminster whereby an agreed sum for Housing 
Benefit would be added to the block grant. The level of 
Housing Benefit expenditure is the product of the number of 
claimants and their eligible payments.  
 
The scale of the settlement is absolutely critical as it is a 
one-off deal that will determine the essential resource level 
open to the Scottish Government for Housing Benefit 
thereafter (unless decisions are taken to make use of other 
Block spending resources). How well Scotland did out of this 
settlement might be expected to depend on factors such as 
the point in the economic cycle at which devolution 
occurred, although this would presumably be taken into 
account during negotiations, as would any expenditure 
implications of structural change, such as the shift to up-
rating the LHA limit with CPI rather than actual market 
rents). It would seem somewhat risky to adopt devolution of 
HB in the hope of successful ‘game playing’ with the 
settlement. A much clearer position is required and this may 
become apparent as a result of the negotiations over 
Council Tax Benefit, which is being devolved to the Scottish 
Parliament mirroring ‘localism’ moves in England. 
 
However, even if a satisfactory settlement were achieved, 
risks would remain. We noted earlier that while rent rebates 
are already incorporated into the Spending Block reflecting 
the need to exert some control over local government rent 
determinations, overall, the Housing Benefit system reflects 
considerable demand-led risks. It will inevitably fluctuate in 
unanticipated ways according to economic change (e.g. 
unemployment) and demographic change (e.g. household 
formation and migration). Whilst this is a risk in any form of 
expenditure, Housing Benefit is much more difficult to 
control than many other items of expenditure.  
 
What would be the benefits of a devolved Housing Benefit 
system? In principle Scotland could design its own housing 
allowance, for example by limiting the scale of the cuts 
outlined above. But it would do so with no additional 
resources because this would imply top-slicing resources 
out of an already highly pressured Scottish Parliament 
budget and individual programmes within it. This means in 
turn that a devolved Housing Benefit operating under the 
reserved social security system with the current level of 
resources could redistribute the value of benefits within its 
current financial envelope and across current recipients. 
However, reform to Housing Benefit that involved a 
substantive redistribution between (potential) recipients 
would, given the income maintenance role that is 
fundamental to Housing Benefit, be likely to create some 
unpalatable choices. For instance, if we recall that the 
income maintenance role of Housing Benefit is to protect 
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post housing cost incomes, then it follows that a 
redistribution in favour of one type of household need will be 
at the expense of another (because of the fixed global sum 
available for Housing Benefit).  
 
This is the invidious trade-off and policy bind that any 
meaningful devolution of Housing Benefit (with the rest of 
social security remaining reserved) must confront and it is 
one that applies just as much if a Universal Credit were to 
be introduced for working age households. 
 
Overall, the devolution of Housing Benefit within the existing 
constitutional structure therefore represents a very 
significant transfer of risk to the Scottish Parliament. Legal 
autonomy over the design of Housing Benefit in these 
circumstances, given the likely long lasting constraints on 
overall available resources, would inevitably require 
unpalatable trade-offs which do not make such a move 
either likely or desirable.  
 
Devolving Housing Benefit 2 (Devolution Max) 
‘Devolution max’ has not been definitively defined. However, 
it would clearly require a significant increase in the degree 
of fiscal autonomy over domestic taxation and expenditure 
decisions (including elements of social security), whilst 
Scotland would remain part of the UK. Social protection is 
the largest single category of UK public expenditure, 
representing some 30 per cent of the total, so this would 
mark a very substantial increase in the powers of the 
Scottish Government.  
 
Such a move would appear to involve a greater transfer of 
risk to Scotland than the devolution of Housing Benefit alone 
– simply because of the scale of the budget. However, the 
disruptive potential of Housing Benefit within this framework 
would be commensurably smaller for two reasons. First, 
Housing Benefit would be part of a larger social security 
budget [for the UK, according to Pawson and Wilcox, 2010, 
Housing Benefit is about 14-15% of the total UK social 
security budget including tax credits] so variations in 
demand for Housing Benefit would have less impact on the 
total. Second, the revenue base would be much wider, since 
the Scottish Parliament would presumably have greater 
borrowing powers (these powers would be required in order 
to finance cyclical deficits), as well as control over a range 
of taxes.   
 
Moreover, the potential benefits arising from autonomy is 
greater than is the case in the devolution of Housing Benefit 
alone. Within existing budgets, reforms would require trade-
offs, but these could be made across a much wider range of 
benefits and households, and would be unlikely to be as 
stark as redistribution between housing benefit claimants 
alone. 
 
The principal attraction of ‘devolution max’ is that there 
would exist the potential for a more fundamental reform of 
housing subsidies, including housing allowances, within the 
context of a reformed social security system. Whilst 
involving difficult choices, there would, for example, be the 
potential to add an allowance for some housing costs into 
mainstream social security benefits, so allowing the housing 
allowance to perform more of an affordability role. In turn 
this would allow the kind of ‘shopping incentives’ that the 
Local Housing Allowance sought to attain without such stark 
trade-offs. So eligible rents need not be based on 100% of 
actual rents, and households could be expected to carry a 
proportion of additional housing costs should they choose to 
consume more housing.  
 
Devolution Max offers the opportunity to move away from 
the present system, with its ambiguous policy aims and 
limiting constraints on the design of housing support. 
Instead the debate could move to the potential to introduce 
a more recognizable continental social security system that 
includes a general element of housing support alongside a 
tailored and more efficient housing allowance based on a 
standard charge rather necessarily being dependent on 
actual housing costs. Altering the relationship between 
social security and Housing Benefit is the only feasible way 
forward to construct a more functional set of low income 
personal housing subsidies. Only by Devolving both 
Housing Benefit alongside the remainder of the social 
security system would allow such a system to be 
contemplated. 
 
More radical reforms might include a tenure neutral system, 
with owner occupiers included in the same scheme as 
tenants. Whilst this has drawbacks (not least as ownership 
involves the acquisition of an asset though helping prevent 
mortgage default can have wider social benefits including 
stabilizing the housing market), it is a debate that should be 
had.  
 
While not underestimating the problems of benefit transition 
(for instance in securing the support of mortgage lenders 
and those providers exposed to cash flow risks from 
significant changes to housing benefit), we think that, 
Devolution Max would also allow the Scottish Government 
to examine housing subsidies across the system as a 
whole, with the ability to set both rent policies and demand 
side subsidies in a way that is frustrated by the current 
Housing Benefit system’s constraining features. It is 
inconceivable the system could be reformed radically 
without Devolution Max (unless of course the UK 
Government took the same route and then this whole 
debate would be moot).  
 
Conclusion 
The debate about devolving Housing Benefit is a multi-
dimensional one. At one level, the pursuit of effective 
housing policies suggests that current Housing Benefit 
policies are flawed structurally but reform is constrained by 
the interaction with income maintenance. Devolution Max 
offers a route to possibly fix some of these important issues. 
At a second level, the politics of the issue is in part about 
the Scottish Government’s resistance to UK Government 
cuts and is linked to the overriding constitutional question. In 
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any case, practical policy implementation of devolved 
Housing Benefit would take years, with or without 
Devolution Max. Third, the Devolution Max solution to the 
Housing Benefit/Income Maintenance integration is also a 
possible solution for the Universal Credit - incorporating a 
housing element in the UC plus adding a separate 
affordability based housing allowance (which could of 
course be regionally varied). As we hint at above, the same 
outcomes sought by devolving social security and Housing 
Benefit in Scotland could be achieved by a willing DWP at 
the UK level and could be generally consistent with the 
principles underlying the Universal Credit.  
 
In this short paper we have not been able to cover all of this 
issues. For instance, we have not touched on the issues 
that arise if one introduces a substantively different social 
security system within one (federated) state. How will 
problems such as benefit tourism and fiscal mobility be 
addressed? In turn, do Devolution Max and Fiscal 
Autonomy make independence inevitable? 
 
____________________ 
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Endnotes 
1 
Thus short paper is based on research for a report for the 
Chartered Institute of Housing (Scotland) – Devolving Housing 
Benefit in Scotland. We acknowledge their support and their 
permission to use material from the larger report in this short paper. 
 
2 
Although there would appear to be little likelihood, after devolution 
of Housing Benefit, that cuts would be reversed. 
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